



# Transfer Payments: Welfare and Social Security Part II

The tyranny of a prince in an oligarchy is not so dangerous to the public welfare as the apathy of a citizen in a democracy.

Charles de Montesquieu



# Incentives vs. Costs

- Although this new benefit calculation is an improvement, it stills offers a 67% marginal tax rate.
- If we don't impose a marginal tax rate at some point, everyone will be eligible for welfare benefits.



# Incentives vs. Costs

- We must recognize a basic dilemma:
  - Low marginal tax rates encourage more work effort but make more people eligible for welfare.
  - High marginal tax rates discourage work effort but make fewer people eligible for welfare.



# Incentives vs. Costs

The **breakeven level of income** is the income level at which welfare eligibility ceases.

$$\textit{Breakeven level of income} = \frac{\textit{Basic benefits}}{\textit{marginal tax rate}}$$



# Incentives vs. Costs

- There is a basic conflict between work incentives (low marginal tax rates) and welfare containment (smaller welfare rolls and outlays).
- Low marginal tax rates encourage work but make it hard to get completely off welfare.



# Tax Elasticity of Labor Supply

The trade-off between more welfare and less work depends on how responsive people are to marginal tax rates.



# Tax Elasticity of Labor Supply

The **tax elasticity of labor supply** is the percentage change in quantity of labor supplied by the percentage change in tax rates.

$$\textit{Tax elasticity of labor supply} = \frac{\% \textit{ change in quantity of labor supplied}}{\% \textit{ change in tax rate}}$$



# Tax Elasticity of Labor Supply

- If the tax elasticity of labor supply were zero, the marginal tax rate wouldn't matter— people would work for nothing.
- In reality, the tax elasticity of labor supply is more in the range of 0.2 to 0.4, so the marginal tax rates *do* affect work effort.



# Time Limits

- TANF recipients must engage in some sort of employment-related activity within two years of receiving benefits.
- There is also a five-year lifetime limit on welfare eligibility.



# Social Security

The Social Security program faces the same conflicts between compassion, incentives and costs.



# Program Features

- The Social Security program is a mix of three separate income transfers.
  - **retirement** benefits
  - **survivor** benefits
  - **disability** benefits



# Chart: Social Security Finances

## Where Tax Revenue Comes From

### Payroll taxes


7.65% paid by workers

7.65% paid by employers

## Where Transfer Payments Go



## Annual Retirement Benefit





# Retirement Age

- People born before 1940 can choose early retirement at age 62–64 and normal retirement at age 65-67.
- Those who choose early retirement do so with reduced benefits.



# Retirement Age

- The age threshold for normal retirement is increasing each year.
- By the year 2022, the age threshold for normal retirement will be age 67.



# Progressive Benefits

- Retirement benefits are based on an individual's wages.
- High-wage workers receive larger benefit checks than low-wage workers.



# Progressive Benefits

- The Social Security benefits formula is progressive because the ratio of benefits to prior wages declines as wages increase.
- This declining wage-replacement rate ensures that low-wage workers receive proportionately greater benefits.



# Progressive Benefits

The **wage replacement rate** is the percentage of base wages paid out in benefits.



# The Earnings Test

The government imposes an **earnings test** to determine how much retirement benefits an older person can collect while still working.

$$\textit{Benefit Amount} = \textit{Maximum Award} - 0.5 \left( \begin{array}{c} \textit{wages in} \\ \textit{excess of ceiling} \end{array} \right)$$



# The Work Disincentive

- In 2004, a person could earn up to \$11,640 and get maximum retirement benefits.
- Earning over \$11,640 results in a 50 cent reduction in benefits for each dollar earned.




# The Work Disincentive

This 50% marginal tax rate creates a large disincentive for Social Security recipients to work.



# Chart: Social Security Work Test






# Declining Labor Supply

- The labor force participation rate for the over-65 has declined dramatically in the US since the 1950s.
  - **Labor-force participation rate** - a measure of the percentage of the population that is either employed or actively seeking a job



# Chart: Declining Labor-Force Participation Rate





# Compassion, Incentives, and Cost

- The primary economic cost of the Social Security program isn't the benefits it pays, but the reduction in total output that occurs when workers retire early.
- The economic cost of Social Security is increased further by a labor supply reduction among *younger* workers.



# Compassion, Incentives, and Cost

As the behavior of both older and younger workers changes, the economic pie shrinks as we try to redistribute it from younger to older workers.



# Trade-Offs

Like any other program, the social security program faces trade-offs between work incentives, budgetary costs and equity.



# Privatize Social Security?

Private retirement programs are **advanced-funded** while Social Security is a **pay-as-you-go** program.



# Privatize Social Security?

- Many people believe the Social Security system should be privatized.
- Instead of paying payroll taxes to fund someone else's benefits, you'd make a contribution to your own pension fund.




# Privatize Social Security?

- The case for privatization is based on both efficiency and equity:
  - Individuals would determine their own saving/consumption choices and eliminate work disincentives.
  - The existing program is unfair to younger workers.



# Chart: A Declining Tax Base

NUMBER OF WORKERS PER RETIREE





# Privatize Social Security?

- Privatization would foster inequities:
  - Low-income workers and other people who saved little while working would end up poor in their golden years.
  - Even in a privatized system, some high earners and savers might end up poor if their investments turned sour.



THE END