Do not think the war that we are waging is the Islamic State’s war alone. Rather, it is the Muslims’ war altogether. It is the war of every Muslim in every place, and the Islamic State is merely the spearhead in this war. It is but the war of the people of faith against the people of disbelief.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
On the morning of 3/22/16, 3 coordinated nail bombings occurred in Belgium: two at Brussels Airport in Zaventem, and one at Maalbeek metro station in Brussels. In these attacks, 35 victims and three suicide bombers were killed, and over 300 were injured. Another bomb was found during a search of the airport. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks.
The Pentagon said Friday (3/25/16) that it had killed Islamic State finance minister, Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, whom many analysts consider the group's No. 2 leader.

Analysts believe al-Qaduli would have been expected to take control of the day-to-day running of Islamic State, if its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed or incapacitated.

The US operation was intended to capture him alive. Helicopters loaded with special operations forces swooped in on a vehicle carrying al-Qaduli, but at the last moment something happened that caused them to decide to fire on the vehicle instead. The official would not say what it was that caused them to modify the plan.
The Rev. Thomas Uzhunnalil, a Salesian priest, was kidnapped in Yemen during a raid on a Catholic nursing home run by Mother Teresa’s organization, Missionaries of Charity.

Archbishop Paul Hinder said on 3/28 that he has “strong indications that Fr Tom is still alive in the hands of the kidnappers.”
DAMASCUS, Syria: Syrian government forces backed by Russian airstrikes drove Islamic State fighters from Palmyra on Sunday (3/27/16), ending the group's 10-month reign of terror over a town whose famed 2,000-year-old ruins once drew tens of thousands of visitors each year.

Government forces had been on the offensive for nearly three weeks to try to retake the central town, known among Syrians as the Bride of the Desert, which fell to the extremists last May. Their advance marks the latest in a series of setbacks for Islamic State, which has come under mounting pressure on several fronts in Iraq and Syria recently.

In comments reported on state TV, Syrian President Bashar Assad described the Palmyra operation as a "significant achievement" offering "new evidence of the effectiveness of the strategy espoused by the Syrian army and its allies in the war against terrorism."
A view shows damaged artefacts inside the museum of the historic city of Palmyra, after forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar al-Assad recaptured the city, in Homs Governorate in this handout picture provided by SANA on March 27, 2016.
Islamic State in the News

The Palmyrene Empire in AD 271.

Queen Zenobia's Last Look upon Palmyra, by Herbert Gustave Schmalz

The ruins of Palmyra in 2010
Islamic State in the News

Military situation as of March 27, 2016, in the Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese conflicts.

- Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
- Controlled by the Iraqi government
- Controlled by the Syrian government
- Controlled by the Lebanese government
- Controlled by Iraqi Kurdistan forces
- Controlled by Syrian Kurdistan forces
- Controlled by Syrian opposition forces
- Controlled by al-Nusra Front
- Controlled by Hezbollah
The much-delayed operation to drive Islamic State from Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, was launched on 10/17/16, more than two years after the jihadis over-ran Mosul and proclaimed its caliphate.

It took until 01/08/17 for Iraqi forces to advance as far as the River Tigris and another two weeks to gain full control of the eastern side of the city.

Western Mosul, although slightly smaller than the east, is more densely populated and includes districts that are seen as pro-Islamic State.
Islamic State attacked a popular Sufi shrine of saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sindh Pakistan on a sacred day for Muslims to pray there (02/16/17). Sufism has been practiced in Pakistan for centuries. Most radical Sunni militant groups despise the Sufis, as well as Shia Muslims, as heretics.

The bomber blew himself up among crowds of devotees, killing at least 72 people, including 20 children, and wounding at least 250 others. The only hospital in the area was said to be overwhelmed.

The blast, in one of the country's most revered shrines, was the deadliest in a week-long string of bombings in Pakistan.
What’s in a name?

full Arabic name: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām

Arabic acronym: Daesh

[Daesh resembles the Arabic word daes (one who crushes or tramples down something underfoot). Within areas under its control, Islamic State considers use of the acronym Daesh punishable by flogging or cutting out the tongue.]

direct English translation: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
 indirect English translation: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

English acronyms: ISIS (media) or ISIL (government)

short Arabic name: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah

English translation: Islamic State (most current)

Un-Islamic Non-State: term used by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016)
What's in a name?

ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)

The term Levant entered English in the late 15th century from French. It derives from the Italian Levante, meaning rising, implying the rising of the sun in the east. As such, it is broadly equivalent to the Arabic term Mashriq, 'the land where the sun rises.'
What’s in a name?

Is Islamic State Islamic? Sunni?

Legitimacy comes through endorsement by Muslim religious leaders and the overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars and leaders have denounced Islamic State.

Sunni critics, including Salafi and jihadist muftis say that Islamic State is not Sunni, but rather modern-day Khawarij: Muslims who have stepped outside the mainstream of Islam, serving an imperial anti-Islamic agenda.

But there are troubling support figures, especially in Pakistan where Islamic State has 18 million supporters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest ter.</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%.
Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey, Q12n.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER
Is Islamic State Islamic?

It’s difficult to logically believe Islamic State is not Islamic when almost everything they do is wrapped in Quranic doctrine. Islamic State’s language and explanations are full of traditional, orthodox Muslim rhetoric.

Many fail to understand the passionate attachment of Islamic State, including its rank and file, to religious doctrine. Even the foot soldiers spout Quranic verses constantly. The ranks of Islamic State are deeply infused with religious vigor. Its Sharia-law caliphate offers something concrete for Muslims wavering on the edge of fundamentalism to grab hold of. Far from using Islam as a mere facade for bloodlust, the Islamic State’s interpretations of Quranic teachings are fundamental to its mission. The beheadings, immolations and the rest are very much religiously inspired.
What's in a name?

Is Islamic State Islamic?

But just because its fighters wrap themselves in conservative Islamic theology doesn’t mean they have a more profound understanding of the faith, its history and its tenets. Islamic State ignores two fundamental aspects of Quranic interpretation from the earliest days of Islam: asbab al-nuzool (context and intent).

Islamic State has no interest in either intent or context. In that sense they are violating fundamental principles of interpretation and reacting against things they don't like in the world, taking cultural history or scriptures out of context to justify violence.

What ISIS Really Wants

The West can never hope to understand Islamic State
What’s in a name?

Un-Islamic perhaps, but is Islamic State a non-state?
Many say: “YES: Islamic State is a non-state entity.”

The CIA’s Predictions From 2000 on the Situation of the World in 2015

Right before George W. Bush became president in 2000, the CIA published a 70-page report on what the world would be like in 2015, and they were correct about a number of things. *Business Insider* analyzed how many of these predictions had come true as of July 2015.

*Large and powerful organizations rather than governments increasingly influence international affairs.*

*This is especially true in the case of ISIS.* However, other shadowy organizations also cross the line between being private and state sponsored. Chinese hackers who are thought to have stolen information about millions of US government employees are an example of the latter.
What’s in a name?

What is a state?

A state is an organized political community living under a single system of government. Speakers of American English often use state and government as synonyms, with both words referring to an organized political group that exercises authority over a particular territory. States may or may not be sovereign.

Under that definition, Islamic State is a state but is it a sovereign state?
What’s in a name?

Sovereignty can be understood in four different ways:

1. **domestic sovereignty**: actual control over a state exercised by an authority organized within the state.

2. **interdependence sovereignty**: actual control of movement across state's borders, assuming borders exist.

3. **international legal sovereignty**: formal recognition by other sovereign states.

4. **Westphalian sovereignty**: lack of authority over state by other than the domestic authority (examples of such other authorities could be a non-domestic church, a non-domestic political organization, or any other external agent).

Islamic State has both domestic and Westphalian sovereignty and close to interdependence sovereignty but it definitely does not have international legal sovereignty.
What’s in a name?

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria?
Not of this Iraq and Syria
Islamic State regards existing states as completely illegitimate.

After WWI, the West divided the Ottoman Empire according to the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.
What’s in a name?

architects of modern Iraq
What's in a name?

1920s: League of Nations mandates
What’s in a name?

Traditional Regional Designations

[Map showing regions of the Middle East with a focus on Shaam and Iraq regions]
What’s in a name?

The bigger issue for Islamic State: Modern Syria and Iraq are putative nation-states and antithetical to Islamic State ideology.

Difference between state and nation

- A state is a political concept.
- A nation is an ethnic concept.
- A state is not subject to external control.
- A nation may or may not be independent from external control.
- A state may consist of one or more nations or peoples.
- A nation may be made of several states.

Bonds That Create a Nation-State

- Culture: a shared way of life (food, dress, behavior, ideals)
- History: a common past; common experiences
- Language: different dialects of one language; one dialect becomes “national language”
- Religion: a religion shared by all or most of the people
- Nationality: belief in common ethnic ancestry that may or may not be true
- Territory: a certain territory that belongs to the ethnic group; its “land”
What’s in a name?

What matters to Islamic State is the ummah, not the nation. Ummah (أمة) is an Arabic word meaning community. It is distinguished from sha'b (شعب) which means a nation with common ancestry or geography. It is a synonym for ummat al-Islamiyah (الأمة الإسلامية), the Islamic community, and is commonly used to mean the collective community of Islamic peoples. In the Quran the ummah typically refers to a single group that shares common religious beliefs, specifically those that are the objects of a divine plan of salvation.
Islamic State proclaims itself not a nation-state, but rather a caliphate.

A caliphate (خِلافة khilāfa) is a form of Islamic government led by a caliph, a person considered a political and religious successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammad and the leader of the entire Muslim community.
What’s in a name?

later proclaimed caliphates; none universal for ummah

Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850.
The **Ottoman Caliphate**, under the **Ottoman dynasty** of the Ottoman Empire, was the last **Sunni Islamic caliphate** of the late medieval and early modern era. During the period of Ottoman growth, Ottoman rulers claimed **caliphal** authority after **Murad I**'s conquest of Edirne in 1362. Later **Selim I**, through the conquest and unification of Muslim lands, became the defender of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina further strengthening the Ottoman claim to the **caliphate** in the Muslim world.
The Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) was a pan-Islamic political campaign launched by Muslims in British India to influence the British government not to abolish the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) Khilafat after WWI.

The Treaty of Versailles (1919) reduced its territorial extent and diminished its political influence but European powers promised to protect the Ottoman emperor's status as the Caliph. Under the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), though, territories such as Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt were severed from the empire and the Khilafat Movement was born in protest.

However, Kamal Atatürk, the pro-Western leader of the nationalist movement in Turkey, deposed the Turkish sultan in 1922. He abolished the khilafat altogether in 1924 and the movement collapsed.

The rise and fall of the Khilafat Movement led to increased tension between Muslims and Hindus in British India and eventually to the separation from India of an Islamic Pakistan.
What’s in a name?

**Islamic State Caliphate?**

The group has referred to itself as the Islamic State since it proclaimed a *worldwide caliphate* in June 2014 and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its *caliph*.

Around the world, Islamic religious leaders have overwhelmingly condemned Islamic State's ideology and actions, arguing that the group has strayed from the path of true Islam and that its actions do not reflect the religion's real teachings or virtues.

A map (below), purportedly showing the areas Islamic State plans to have under its control within five years, has been widely shared online.
The Origins of Islamic State

1999 in Jordan, Strengthened in Iraq 2003, 2004

Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) was a militant *jihadist* group led by the Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The group started in Jordan and became a decentralized network during the Iraq insurgency. Foreign fighters were widely thought to play a key role.

Following al-Zarqawi's pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden's *al-Qaeda* network on October 17, 2004, the group became known as *al-Qaeda in Iraq* (official name: Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn). After several rounds of name changes and mergers with other groups, the organization is now known as Islamic State.
The Origins of Islamic State

2008-2014 Decline, Then Resurgence

In September 2006, 30 tribes in Iraq’s Anbar Province formed the Anbar Awakening, an alliance to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq militants.

After initially accepting al-Qaeda in Iraq due to a shared anti-occupation and anti-Shiite agenda, Sunni Arabs chafed under al-Qaeda’s violently fanatic religious program.

Al-Qaeda terrorized those who opposed it, eventually prompting Sunnis to partner with US forces to rid their communities of al-Qaeda. The collaboration, successfully tested in Anbar Province (once Iraq’s most violent), was adopted in other al-Qaeda-plagued regions, contributing to a dramatic neutralization of the insurgency.
The Origins of Islamic State

Tribalism in Iraq

Major tribes and clans in Iraq

http://healingiraq.blogspot.com
The Origins of Islamic State

Iraq’s Downward Spiral

- 2009: US forces begin to withdraw
- 2010: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced as leader of Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)
- 2011: Arab Spring protests and rebellions, and final withdrawal of US troops
- 2012: Major Sunni groups in Iraq boycott parliament, reject Shia-led government of Nouri al-Maliki.
- 2012: Civil war in Syria, al-Baghdadi announces new offensive
- 2013: ISI expands into Syria, announces the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Continuing Amalgamations and Divisions

ISI established a large presence in Sunni-majority Al-Raqqah, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo provinces of Syria.

In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the merger of ISI with the Syrian Civil War jihadist faction, al-Nusra Front, to form the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Al-Nusra leader al-Julani disputed this merging of the two groups and appealed to al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, who issued a statement that ISIL should be abolished and that al-Baghdadi should confine his group’s activities to Iraq.

Al-Baghdadi dismissed al-Zawahiri’s ruling and took control of a reported 80% of al-Nusra’s foreign fighters. Al-Qaeda severed all ties with ISIL.
Continuing Islamic State Gains

- 2013: Simultaneous raids on Taji and Abu Ghraib prisons, freeing more than 500 prisoners, veterans of the Iraqi insurgency

- 2014: Proclamation of worldwide caliphate, ISIL renamed the Islamic State (IS), al-Baghdadi named caliph (Caliph Ibrahim)
  - The inflow of jihadists that followed, from around the world, was unprecedented in its pace and volume.

- 2014: Seizure of Mosul and other major cities in northern Iraq, foreign affiliates established in Libya, Philippines

- 2015: Foreign affiliates established in Nigeria, Yemen, Afghanistan
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?
By 2 October 2014, Islamic State succeeded in capturing 350 Kurdish villages and towns within the vicinity of Kobanê Syria, generating a wave of some 300,000 displaced Kurds fleeing across the border into Turkey’s Şanlıurfa Province. By January 2015, the number of displaced Kurds had risen to 400,000.
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?

Islamic State Defeated in Kobanî

Front line map of the Siege of Kobanî, from Islamic State control in late October and early November 2014, to the YPG/YPJ counter-offensive on January 24, 2015, after the decisive YPG/YPJ capture of Mistanour Hill (lower right of yellow area) on January 19.

yellow: YPG/YPJ-controlled areas
grey: Islamic State-controlled areas
shaded areas/purple dots: contested areas
red dashed line: maximum extent of Islamic State control (c 11/01/2014)
black dotted line: front line 12/27/14
blue line: boundary of Kobanî city
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?

Ramadi Iraq
December 2015-January 2016
Major Loss
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?

IRAQ

Gack: "People are returning to Ramadi out of desperation"

The German journalist Uli Gack recently travelled to Iraq to make a feature program. In Ramadi, he spoke to people who, clutching at straws, have returned to what is essentially an uninhabitable town.

50% of the town is in ruins. Many of the buildings are mined. Sunni tribesmen defused more than 3,000 explosive devices in houses in the space of a few days and they haven't found all of them.

Many of these IEDs are designed so that the only thing you can do is blow up the whole house. You can't defuse them anymore. A lot of them have a delayed-action fuse or are remote-controlled.

Where did the people who are in Ramadi now come from?

There are big Sunni refugee camps outside the gates of Baghdad. People were prevented from entering the city, because the Shia rulers fear that there are sleeper cells among the Sunnis who are cooperating with the Islamic State. Many of the Sunnis just want to go back so they have a roof over their heads, but it's scarcely possible to survive in Ramadi.
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?

Armenian Genocide Memorial Church, Der ez-Zor Syria before and after 2014 Islamic State Attack
2015: Turning of the Tide or Mere Fluctuations?

Islamic State retreat in Iraq and northern Syria

advance in central and southern Syria

June 2014

December 2015
Control of territory is an essential precondition for Islamic State’s authority in the eyes of its supporters. Where it holds power, Islamic State collects taxes, regulates prices, operates courts and administers services ranging from health care and education to telecommunications.
Islamic State’s losses continue to rise. In the last year, Islamic State has lost around half of what it controlled a few years ago. Among the towns it has lost are Manbij, Kobane, al-Qaryatain, Tikrit and Fallujah. Along with the towns, it has lost access to the Turkish border, which means the supply of foreign fighters, weapons and ammunition is drying up. Losing cities means losing money too... about one-third of its capability to make money so far.

Now that the caliphate is shrinking, thousands of fighters are leaving.
Since the Mosul offensive began, Islamic State fighters have been losing territory. However, gains slowed when Iraqi government forces met stiff resistance in the city of Mosul.

Satellite images have revealed extensive damage to Mosul's infrastructure, buildings and archaeological sites.
2016: Caliphate or Shadow Organization?

Islamic State is moving from an organization that controls large amounts of territory into a terrorist group that is striking targets. In 2014, every month there were about 150 to 200 attacks. In some months of 2016, there have been almost 400 attacks. Islamic State is trying to encourage people who believe the organization is declining to continue to fight, to show that they still exist and they’re still targeting the infidels.

Increasingly, Islamic State is relying on inspiring people to carry out attacks in its name, which means its leaders do not have to mastermind complex plots. Islamic State is branching out too: into Nigeria, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Egypt, as well as parts of Europe. But there, too, it is under threat.

At the moment, it still controls its most important cities: Mosul in Iraq (barely) and Raqqa in Syria. Despite territorial losses, Islamic State survives, thanks in no small part to its status as the best-funded terrorist organization in history.
Islamic State Ideology

Salafism

- fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers
  - *al-salaf al-salih*, the **pious predecessors** (the first three generations of Muslims)
  - reject religious **innovation**, or *bida*, and support the implementation of *sharia*: the religious legal system governing the members of the Islamic faith derived from religious prophecy, as opposed to human legislation
  - Most tend to be **apolitical**.
  - Salafism often divided into three **categories**:
    - **purists** (or **quietists**): largest group, avoid politics
    - **activists**: those involved in politics
    - **jihadists**: smallest group, Islamic State
Islamic State Ideology

Islamic State’s Jihadi- Salafism beliefs and practices:

- Has an almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam, but condemns the current Saudi government as followers of secular law and disbelievers.
- Represents the restoration of the caliphate of early Islam, a global caliphate, headed by a caliph.
- All Muslims are required to pledge allegiance to Islamic State, as the caliphate.
- Only a legitimate authority can undertake the leadership of global jihad.
- Without a caliphate, there can be no offensive jihad according to traditional Islamic law.

Waging war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph. As a caliphate, Islamic State is commanded to forcibly expand into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims.

The caliph must wage jihad at least once a year. He may not rest or he will fall into a state of sin.

The newly-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim
Islamic State Ideology

Islamic State’s *Jihadi- Salafism* beliefs and practices:

- The state has an **obligation to terrorize its enemies**, a holy order to scare them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.

- The first priority over other areas of combat, such as fighting non-Muslim countries, is the **purification of Islamic society**.

- A defiled Islam must be **purged of apostasy**, often with bloody sectarian killings.

- Believes in the **importance of following early Muslim practices** such as embracing slavery, beheadings and crucifixion “without apology,” as well as a *jizya* tax on Christians.
Islamic State Ideology

Islamic State’s *Jihadi- Salafism* beliefs and practices:

- The promised pure Mohammadan Islam is based on three rejections:
  - **reject traditional Islamic tolerance** for Christians and Jews
  - **reject infidel ideologies** (especially democracy, government of men by men rather than by Allah) since the only form of government in pure Mohammadan Islam is the caliphate and the only law is sharia
  - **reject diluted (iltiqati) forms of Islam** (for example, insisting that Islam is a religion of peace when there can never be peace between Islam and not-Islam)
Islamic State Ideology

Islamic State’s Jihadi-Salafism beliefs and practices:

• Recognition of international organizations such as the UN, decision-making through voting, agreements via long-term peace treaties, the acceptance of any border ... all these are *haram* (religiously forbidden).

• **Millenarians:**
  • The **final Day of Judgment** by God is near and will follow Islamic State’s defeat of the army of Rome (the Eastern Roman empire, the Republic of Turkey that ended the last self-identified caliphate) at the Syrian city of Dabiq.

  The *caliphate* will expand until the **anti-Christ** (*Dajjal*) appears and slaughters the *caliphate*’s fighters.

  Only 5,000 will remain, cornered in Jerusalem, when **Jesus** (the second-most-revered prophet in Islam) returns to Earth, spears *Dajjal* and **leads the Muslims to victory**.
Islamic State Ideology

Islamic State’s Jihadi-Salafism beliefs and practices:

• Imposes a strict adherence to following the precepts established by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers (Sharia law), surpassing even that of other Salafi groups.

• Sharia laws are in abeyance until a caliphate is established. Create a caliphate, and a huge body of jurisprudence suddenly awakens since a caliph is required to implement all of Sharia law.

• The provision of social welfare (free housing, food, clothing, medical care, etc) for all is not a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy obligation inherent in God’s law.

• The penal code includes the establishment of religious police to root out vice and enforce attendance at salat prayers, the widespread use of capital punishment and the destruction or re-purposing of any non-Sunni religious buildings.
Islamic State Ideology

Jihadi-Salafism is related to Wahhabi Islam (official religion of Saudi Arabia) and is often referred to as untamed Wahhabism.

Wahhabism

- Founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab c.1750, friend of the founder of the Saudi Dynasty
- Against laxity in enforcement of Shari’ah law
- Against Sufism praying at tombs and pilgrimages (saint worship) and other practices seen to be a return to pre-Islamic traditions and condemned as bida’- innovation
- Return to the traditions of the Golden Age
- Against modernity, secularity and Enlightenment

Islamic State condemns the followers of secular law as disbelievers, putting the current Saudi government in that category, but most Islamic State qadis (judges) are probably Saudis.
Islamic State Ideology

Despite the ideological connections, Saudi Arabia is building a 600-mile great wall and ditch with Iraq to shield itself from Islamic State.
Islamic State Ideology

Takfiri Interpretation of Islam

A takfiri (تكفيري) is a Sunni Muslim who accuses another Muslim of apostasy (abandonment or renunciation of a religious belief).

In principle the only group authorized to declare someone kafir (unbeliever) is the ulema (body of Muslim scholars recognized as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology), and this is only done after all the prescribed legal precautions have been taken.

However, a growing number of splinter Wahhabist/Salafist groups, classified by some scholars as Salafi-Takfiris, have split from the orthodox method of establishing takfir through the processes of Sharia law. They have reserved the right to declare apostasy against any Muslim, in addition to non-Muslims.

Ibn Taymiyyah

What can my enemies do to me? My paradise is in my heart, it is with me wherever I go. To imprison me is to provide me with seclusion. To send me into exile is to send me away in the Path of Allah. And to kill me is to make me a martyr.

Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) sought the return of Sunni Islam to what he viewed as earlier interpretations of the Quran and the Sunnah, and is thought to have had considerable influence in contemporary Wahhabism, Salafism and Jihadism. He is renowned for his fatwa issued against the Mongol rulers, declaring jihad by Muslims against the rulers as compulsory, on the grounds that they did not follow Sharia and as such were not Muslim, despite their claims to have converted to Islam.
Islamic State Ideology

In 1258, the Mongols destroyed Baghdad. Survivors said that “the waters of the Tigris ran black with ink from the enormous quantities of books flung into the river and red from the blood of the scientists and philosophers killed.” The siege marked the end of the Islamic Golden Age.

Ilkhanate, 1256-1353
Mongol State
Rulers convert to Islam (superficially?)

Ilkhanate

1256–1353
(AD)
Islamic State Ideology

But even Islamic State has limits on *takfiri* tendencies. Social media activists who support Islamic State have said on Twitter that the organization recently executed one of its *Sharia* judges on the grounds that he had "excessive *takfiri* tendencies."

According to Twitter, users known for supporting the *Hazimi* trend within Islamic State (named after the Saudi figure Ahmed Al Hazimi who is known for his views that ignorance is no excuse for being denigrated as an *infidel*) claim that Islamic State's leadership has started to execute judges who are accused of excessively using *takfir* against those who should be exempt due to ignorance.

According to a number of *Jihadi-Salafi* online forums, Islamic State detained Sheikh Abu Jaafar Al-Hattab and a number of other Sharia judges last September, the month in which Judge Abu Omar Al-Kuwaiti was mysteriously executed. Some linked Al-Kuwaiti's execution to his proclamation of Baghdadi as a *kafir* (infidel).
One difference between Islamic State and other Islamist and jihadist movements, including al-Qaeda, is the group's emphasis on eschatology and apocalypticism: a belief in a final day of judgment by God and a belief that the arrival of Imam Mahdi (prophesied redeemer of Islam who will rule before the Day of Judgment and rid the world of evil) is near. Islamic State believes that it will defeat the army of Rome at the town of Dabiq, in fulfillment of prophecy.

**Dabiq**

online magazine used by Islamic State for propaganda and recruitment, replaced with *Rumiyah* (Rome) in 2016
Islamic State Strategy

Islamic State has a sophisticated propaganda and social media outreach.

FLORIDA WOMAN SUES TWITTER FOR GIVING ISIS A PLATFORM

Twitter’s approach to handling terrorists on its platform is already messy. Now, it’s getting even messier.

Tamara Fields, a Florida woman whose husband was killed in a lone wolf terrorist attack in Jordan, has filed a lawsuit against Twitter, accusing the company of supporting the spread of ISIS by enabling ISIS leaders to recruit and fundraise on its platform. She’s suing for damages.

“Without Twitter,” the suit alleges, “the explosive growth of ISIS over the last few years into the most-feared terrorist group in the world would not have been possible.”
Islamic State Strategy

Social Media Strikes Back

Hacktivist group Anonymous has reported that more than 5,500 Twitter accounts belonging to Islamic State have been taken down. It occurred after the collective declared a “total war” on the militant group following the Paris attacks.

Aware that Islamic State has its own hackers, Anonymous expressed confidence that the militant group “does not have hackers like we have hackers.”

#OpParis: Anonymous takes down 5,500 ISIS Twitter accounts

Published time: 17 Nov, 2015 13:06
Social Media Strikes Back

*Twitter* has significantly ramped up its anti-Islamic State efforts by shutting down thousands of terrorists' accounts and adding staff to monitor terrorist activity on its network.

The social media company said in a blog post that it has suspended 125,000 accounts over the past seven months for threatening or promoting terrorist acts. Most of the people behind the accounts were affiliated with or supported Islamic State, *Twitter* said.

Islamic State recruiters have successfully used *Twitter* to attract people to join their cause.

"We condemn the use of *Twitter* to promote terrorism," the company said in the blog post. "As the nature of the terrorist threat has changed, so has our ongoing work in this area."
Today the Islamic State is as much a media conglomerate as a fighting force. According to Documenting the Virtual Caliphate, a 2015 report by the Quilliam Foundation, the organization releases, on average, 38 new items per day: 20-minute videos, full-length documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, pamphlets in languages ranging from Russian to Bengali.

The group’s closest peers are not other terrorist groups but Western brands, marketing firms, and publishing outfits from PepsiCo to BuzzFeed— who ply the Internet with memes and messages in the hopes of connecting with customers. And like those ventures, the Islamic State sticks with a few tried-and-true techniques for boosting user engagement.
Islamic State Strategy

Terrorize, Mobilize and Polarize

According to Jason Burke, a journalist writing on Jihadi-Salafism, Islamic State’s goal is to "terrorize, mobilize and polarize."

Terror intimidates civilian populations and forces enemy governments "to make rash decisions that they otherwise would not choose."

Mobilize supporters by motivating them with, for example, spectacular deadly attacks on enemy soil such as the November 2015 Paris attacks.

Polarize by driving Muslim populations - particularly in the West - away from their governments, thus increasing the appeal of the Islamic State caliphate to them. Get rid of neutral parties through either absorbing them or eliminating them.
Islamic State Strategy

Sleepers and Martyrdom-Seekers

- Virtually all Islamic State military attacks begin with one or several suicide bombers driving explosives-rigged cars or trucks at the target, softening it up for combat squads to go in. So much so that the "martyrdom-seekers" have been called the organization's air force, since they serve a similar purpose.

- Islamic State dispatches cash-strapped sleeper agents into the ranks of its opposition, such as the Iraqi Security Forces or the Free Syrian Army, to slowly and covertly buy or build a constituency.

- Islamic State’s network of sleeper cells and security-minded members represent the organization's core and, even if Islamic State is defeated or contained militarily, will make it difficult to vanquish all together.
Islamic State Strategy

The Ba’athists

Former agents and officers of Saddam Hussein’s now-outlawed Ba’ath Party (Ba’athism: an ideology mixing Arab nationalist, pan-Arabism, Arab socialist and anti-imperialist interests, calls for unification of Arab world into a single state) dominate Islamic State’s leadership. They are naturally disciplined, well organized and know the lay of the land. Over time, some Ba’athists have become more and more Islamist.

- Ex-Ba’athists shape the group’s jihadist ideology, handle its security (weeding out infiltrators) and military operations, and ensure its resilience.
- Ali al-Anbari is the mastermind of the group’s espionage and clandestine services, heading the Islamic State Security and Intelligence Council and tasked with running a vast honeycomb network of spies, operatives and sleeper cells.
- Ex-Ba’athists have established an underground network, whose operatives are often disguised, even from other members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ba’ath regime</th>
<th>Islamic State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Muslim al-Afari al-Turkmâni</td>
<td>Baghdadi’s deputy for Iraq until killed in a U.S. airstrike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ali al-Anbari</td>
<td>Baghdadi’s deputy for the Islamic State in Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ayman al-Iraqi</td>
<td>Senior leader, believed to be a military council member.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Islamic State Strategy

Wilayats / Governates

• A prime example of Islamic State’s motto, *survive and expand*, are its *wilayats* (provinces). Islamic State’s *wilayats* are affiliates that have pledged their loyalty (*bay’at*) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Caliph Ibrahim).

• Islamic State affiliates, referred to by the group as *wilayats*, come in different shapes and sizes.
  - **statelet**: governate that holds territory and operates like a state (the 3 three *wilayats* in Libya)
  - **insurgency**: governate that occupies territory, but cannot always hold it, and is unwilling or unable to perform the functions of a state (Boko Haram affiliate in Nigeria)
  - **terrorist organization**: governate that holds no territory and can only operate clandestinely (*wilayats* in Saudi Arabia)
  - **horizon *wilayats***: groups pledged to Islamic State that have not been designated formally as *wilayats*, areas that produce high numbers of foreign fighters or suffer large amounts of Islamic State-inspired violence, may emerge over time as official provinces
Islamic State Strategy

Islamic State Affiliate Assessment & Forecast
As of June 2016 Source: Clint Watts, FPRI

Central Asia

Saudi Arabia

“al Qaeda Rivals”

Bangladesh

Caucasus

Tunisia

Yemen

Afghanistan

Libya

“Morphing”

India

Egypt

Indonesia

Philippines

Somalia

“Bandwagon”

Nigeria

Affiliate Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Outlook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statelet</td>
<td>Strong Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>Slight Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorist Organization</td>
<td>Slight Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horizon Wilayat</td>
<td>Strong Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Divergent interests with Islamic State: Convergent

Less - (Strength of Bonds w/Islamic State) – More
Islamic State Strategy

Wilayats / Governates

- Local groups are attracted to Islamic State for many reasons:
  - genuine conviction (especially young Sunni men)
  - elevate local group’s cause
  - access to financial or technical aid
  - access to experienced fighters
  - opportunity for local commanders to split from al Qaeda or other existing groups without provoking a backlash from their followers
  - opportunity for aspiring leaders to mask their power grabs with claims of doctrinal purity
- Accepting the Islamic State label often leads local groups to shift their tactics and ideology. In addition to fighting local government forces and rival groups as they did before, many affiliates begin making sectarian attacks and targeting Westerners in the region.
Islamic State Strategy

Wilayats / Governates

• The wilayats offer benefits to the core, too.
  • bolster Islamic State’s self-image by making the organization seem more powerful and attractive
  • give Islamic State strategic reach, allowing it to tap into fighters and networks around the Middle East
  • give the core group fallback options (contingency planning)
  • generate headlines for the group and attract more foreign fighters to its core organization

• Despite all the benefits wilayats offer Islamic State, they also come with their share of trouble.
  • can weaken the jihadist movement as a whole since many of them exist solely because of local rivalries
  • not all are obedient servants
  • local groups retain their own command structure, personnel and parochial goals ... often don’t fit with those of the core group
  • local groups bring their enemies with them as well
Islamic State Strategy

Wilayats / Governates

- **Islamic State’s “ink spot” strategy:** The wilayats are mini Islamic states that will expand through proselytizing and war. As the ink spots expand, the borders will meet up, forming a larger entity. And as more and more provinces pledge allegiance to Islamic State, they encourage other independent groups to do the same.

- Figuring out where exactly Islamic State has established a *formal* presence and where local fighters are merely emulating the group can be difficult. In places where Islamic State does have a more formal presence:
  - foreign fighters play important role creating and maintaining ties between local group and core
  - strategy aimed at weakening wilayats must (1) severe link between core group and affiliates and (2) contain, weaken and defeat affiliates ... Without instruction from core, wilayats forced to go their own way and perhaps create new problems for Islamic State’s core.
Islamic State Strategy

IS has increasingly looked to the Philippines to establish a wilayat in SE Asia. Support for IS in Mindanao province has facilitated cooperation across clan/ethnic lines, widened the extremist recruitment pool to include computer-savvy university students and opened new international communication and possibly funding channels.

declared wilayats in parts of Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Caucasus

IS has most worrisome attacks in Bangladesh and Kuwait by terrorists or fighters operating in IS’s name

IS has a control zone and an operational zone

Islamic State's Governates control zone operational zone

countries with one or more Islamic State Wilayats/Governates

excellent summary

Islamic State and Its Affiliates
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPORT/PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE TO IS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-nilam of the Koran and Sunnah [Sudan]  - 1 Aug. 2014 - Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-Tawhid in India [India] - 4 Oct. 2014 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah [Philippines] 27 Apr. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ghuraba [Algeria] - 7 Jul. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djamaat Houmat ad-De'wa as-Salafiya (DHDS) [Algeria] 19 Sep. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ansar Battalion [Algeria] 4 Sep. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jundullah [Pakistan] - 17 Nov. 2014 - Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) [Pakistan/Uzbekistan] Video - 31 Jul. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of the Mujahid in Khorasan (ten former TTP commanders) [Pakistan] - 10 Jan. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State Libya (Darnah) [Libya] - 9 Nov. 2014 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lions of Libya [Libya] (Unconfirmed) - 24 Sep. 2014 - [Support/Allegiance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) [Indonesia] - Aug. 2014 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT) [Indonesia] - 1 Jul. 2014 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sector of Kabardino-Balkria of the Caucasus Emirate (CE) [Russia] - 26 Apr. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahideen of Tunisia of Kairouan [Tunisia] 18 May 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahideen of Yemen [Yemen] - 10 Nov. 2014 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters for the Islamic State in Yemen [Yemen] - 4 Sep. 2014 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-Islam [Iraq] - 8 Jan. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nokchicho Wilayat of the Caucasus Emirate (CE) [Russia] - 15 Jun. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ansar Battalion [Algeria] - 4 Sep. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shabaab Juba Region Call Bashir Abu Numan [Somalia] - 7 Dec. 2015 - Allegiance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some analysts believe Islamic State's violence is "not some whimsical, crazed fanaticism, but a very deliberate, considered strategy." For Islamic State, even "the most abominable of the levels of savagery" are better "than stability under the order of unbelief," i.e. any regime other than Islamic State.

One observer has described Islamic State's publicizing of its mass executions and civilian killings as part of "a conscious plan designed to instill among believers a sense of meaning that is sacred and sublime, while scaring the hell out of fence-sitters and enemies."

Another describes the purpose of the violence as psychologically breaking those under its control "so as to ensure their absolute allegiance through fear and intimidation," while generating "outright hate and vengeance" in its enemies.
Islamic State Strategy

Violence

Islamic State directs its violence against Shia Muslims, Alawites, Assyrians, and Chaldeans, Syriacs and Armenians, Yazidis, Druze, Shabaks and Mandeans in particular.

Amnesty International holds Islamic State responsible for the ethnic cleansing of ethnic and religious minority groups in northern Iraq on a "historic scale," putting entire communities "at risk of being wiped off the map of Iraq."

A report released in September 2014 describes how Islamic State has "systematically targeted non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslim communities, killing or abducting hundreds, possibly thousands, of individuals and forcing more than 830,000 others to flee the areas it has captured since June 2014."
Violence: Yazidis

The Yazidis are a Kurdish religious community whose syncretic but ancient religion Yazidism is linked to Zoroastrianism and ancient Mesopotamian religions. Yazidis form a distinct and independent religious community and have their own culture.

Yazidis are monotheists, believing God is the creator of the world, which he placed under the care of seven holy beings or angels, the chief of whom is Melek Taus. The Peacock Angel, as world-ruler, causes both good and bad to befall individuals. He is an ambivalent character who temporarily fell from God's favor, before his remorseful tears extinguished the fires of his hellish prison and he was reconciled with God.

Islamic State considers the Yazidis devil-worshippers. When Islamic State captures a Yazidi area they execute the elderly, sick, men and boys. Women and girls are treated as sex slaves or spoils of war, and are tortured, raped and eventually sold or murdered, although many commit suicide. Babies suffer an unknown fate.
Islam State Strategy

Iraq's Yazidis Fleeing from ISIS Ethnic Cleansing

No Food
No Water
No Home

Images from top, left and right:
Yazidi refugees receiving support from the International Rescue Committee. A member of the U.S. Mt. Sinjar Assessment Team being greeted by locals near Sinjar, Iraq. Bundles of water inside of a C-17 Globemaster III before a humanitarian airdrop by the United States Air Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sinjar, Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria[1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Yazidi people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack type</td>
<td>Genocidal massacre, ethnic cleansing, forced conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>5,000+ Yazidis killed (UN)[2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fatal injuries</td>
<td>5,000–7,000 Yazidi women abducted[2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assailants</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Islamic State Strategy

Violence: Shia Muslims

In Islamic State-occupied territories in western and northern Iraq, there have been frequent accounts of fighters capturing groups of people and releasing the Sunnis while the Shiites are singled out for execution.

Islamic State believes that the Shiites are apostates and must die in order to forge a pure form of Islam.

In a chilling video that appeared to have been made more than a year ago in the Anbar Province of Iraq, Islamic State fighters stopped three truck drivers in the desert and asked them whether they were Sunnis or Shiites. All three claimed to be Sunni. Then the questions got harder. They were asked how they performed each of the prayers: morning, midday and evening. The truck drivers disagreed on their methods and all were shot.
Islamic State Strategy

Violence: Sexual Slavery

As of August 2015, the trade in sex slaves appeared to remain restricted to Yazidi women and girls. It has reportedly become a recruiting technique to attract men from conservative Muslim societies, where dating and casual sex are not allowed. Nazand Begikhani said of the Yazidi victims, "These women have been treated like cattle ... They have been subjected to physical and sexual violence, including systematic rape and sex slavery. They've been exposed in markets in Mosul and in Raqqa, Syria, carrying price tags." According to UN reports the price list for Islamic State sex slaves range from $40 to $160.

In mid-October, the UN confirmed that 5,000–7,000 Yazidi women and children had been abducted by Islamic State and sold into slavery.
Islamic State Strategy

Christians, Jews and most other non-Muslims are *dhimmis* in strict Islamic law.

*Dhimmī* (ذمي) is an historical term referring to the non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state. The word literally means "protected person." According to scholars, *dhimmis* have fully protected rights in their own communities, but as citizens of the Islamic state they have certain restrictions and the obligation to pay the *jizya* tax, which complements the *zakat*, or Islamic tax, paid by Muslim subjects.

Historically, *dhimmi* status was applied to Jews, Christians and Sabians. It also came to be applied to Zoroastrians, Mandaeans, Hindus and Buddhists. Eventually, the Hanafi school, the largest school of Islamic jurisprudence, and the Maliki school, the second largest, applied this term to all non-Muslims living in Islamic lands outside the sacred area surrounding Mecca.

*Jizya* is no longer imposed by any Muslim states.
Dhimma Contract for Christians of Al-Qaryatayn (unedited):

This is the safety assurance given by Emir Al-Moumeneen Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to Christians’ safety for their souls and wealth, and not to be forced on their religion or injured by Muslims under the following conditions:

• Not to build in their city nor nearby any church, abbey or monk’s hermitage.
• Not to show their crosses or books (bible) in-front of Muslims in the city markets or on the roads, and not to use speakers while conducting their masses.
• Not to make Muslims hear their prayers, religious readings or ringing their church bells.
• Not to participate in any hostile acts against the Islamic state, or hiding spies and wanted people, and if they know about any threat against the Islamic State they must notify it.
• To comply with not to show any of their worship rituals in front of Muslims.
Islamic State Strategy

_Dhimma Contract for Christians of Al-Qaryatayn_ (unedited):

- To respect Islam and Muslims, and not to criticize them.
- To pay jizya, which is equal to 4 dinars/year (applied on Christians under the Islamic rule in the past, and 1 dinar = 4.25 g of 24 karat gold) that means the annual jizya would be 17 g of 24 kt gold applied on wealthy Christians, 50% of this amount on middle class and 25% on poor Christians, and this amount can be divided in two installments. According to the current gold prices in Syria, the jizya will be estimated as the following: 17 x 36.59 = $622 / year on wealthy people, 50% x 622 = $311 / year on middle class people, 25% x 622 = $155.5 / year on poor people. (high figures for Syrians)
- Not to carry/own weapons.
- Not to sell pork meats or alcohol to Muslims, and not to drink alcohol in public.
- They must have their own cemeteries as usual.
- To comply with the Islamic State rules of decency and conservative dress code.
small numbers of fighters are also reported to have come from Bangladesh, Chile, Ivory Coast, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago
It has been estimated that 27,000 foreign jihadists made the trip from 86 countries, more than half of them from the Middle East and North Africa.
Foreign Fighters in Islamic State

- Islamic State followers are clearly convinced they are following Allah’s will. Religion has a role but it is a role of justification, of legitimacy. Beliefs are not the only thing that draws foreign fighters to Islamic State.

- **personal identity**: have invested a lot of effort and identity to become Muslim so identity is important to them ... see Muslims being slaughtered and think, ‘I need to protect my community.’

- **search for identity, belonging, purpose**: Islamic State empowers individuals within a collective and with no concern about their past ... chance to believe they are special, part of something new, secret, powerful

- a sense of emotional and moral outrage

- allure of being members of – and defenders of – the ultimate in-group

- angry, or even bored, young men in search of a call to arms and a thrilling cause

- the concept of reviving or renewing the caliphate

- fear, money, adventure, alienation, (most certainly) anger at the West for what happened in Iraq
Foreign Fighters in Islamic State

- After months on the frontlines, thousands of Islamic State fighters are ready to go home. But many of the people back home fear that underground cells are at work, and even seasoned security intelligence operatives say they are at a loss as how to cope with the numbers.
- Nowhere is the potential for disaster greater than in Jordan and Tunisia, which have seen more citizens leave to join Islamic State than other countries and which border Islamic State-held territory in Syria and Libya, respectively.
- Some states have passed legislation criminalizing travel to a conflict zone, funding terrorist organizations, receiving support from a terrorist group, or promoting terrorist ideology. But there are increased risks of radicalization in overcrowded prisons.
Foreign Fighters in Islamic State

Legend
- ISIS-directed or resourced attack
- ISIS-inspired attack
- Stated ISIS target
- ISIS-linked arrests*

*size of circle correlates to number of arrest events

Foreign Fighters
- Less than 100
- From 100 to 249
- From 250 to 499
- From 500 to 1000
- Over 1000
- No data

Source: The Soufan Group, December 2015

Content and graphic by Claire Coyne, Rebecca Acree, Sarah Crockett, Caitlin Forrest and Harleen Gambhir
Islamic State Funding

According to a 2015 study by the Financial Action Task Force, Islamic State's five primary sources of revenue, in order of significance, are as follows:

- **proceeds from the occupation of territory** (including control of banks, oil and gas reservoirs, taxation, extortion, robbery of economic assets, sales of artifacts, drugs)
- **kidnapping for ransom**
- **donations from Saudi Arabia and Gulf states**, often disguised as "humanitarian charity"
- **private financing** from citizens in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and foreign fighters enlisted through recruitment drives in Saudi Arabia in particular
- **fundraising through modern communication networks**

**Independent Wealthy**
Unlike other groups, which rely on state sponsors, major donors, or abuse of charity, ISIS is financially independent due to its successful criminal enterprise.

**An Illegal “Inheritance”**
Then known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group brought in some $70 million a year through criminal activities—and was so flush that central al-Qaeda asked the group for money in 2005.

**Growing the Business**
ISIS continues to engage in activities such as smuggling, extortion, and crime. Not being tied to major donors has helped the group evade counter-terrorism finance measures.

**Private Gulf Donations**
Private contributions to ISIS—as well as to other groups operating in Syria, such as al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra—are a concern for U.S. policymakers. Wealthy citizens and others in the Persian Gulf countries have funneled hundreds of millions into the conflict.

**U.S. Response**
Washington can tighten counter-terrorism financing cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but significantly undermining ISIS’s financial base would now require rolling back its access to local Syrian and Iraqi income sources.

**Sources**
- Declaring an Islamic State, Running a Criminal Enterprise
- Qatar and ISIS Funding: The U.S. Approach
- Saudi Funding of ISIS
- The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait

**ALL IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: GULF FUNDING**

KUWAIT is the “epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria” according to the Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

Another permissive environment for terrorist financing, QATAR’s political interests sometimes conflict with America’s counterterrorism agenda.

Contrary to conventional thinking, SAUDI ARABIA’s financial monitoring efforts are effective enough that donors there are encouraged to send money through Kuwait to ensure it reaches Syria.

**Stay Ahead of Events in Iraq**
WashingtonInstitute.org @washinstitute
Islamic State Funding

Over the last 15 years, Doha Qatar has become a de facto operating hub for a deeply interconnected community of Salafists. This tiny, gas-rich emirate has pumped tens of millions of dollars through obscure funding networks to hard-line Syrian rebels and extremist Salafists.

Clerics have been hosted by ministries and called to talk for important events. Charities have touted the cause — charities like the Sheikh Eid bin Mohammad al Thani Charity, regulated by the Qatari Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which is probably the biggest and most influential activist Salafi-controlled relief organization in the world.

Wealthy Gulf individuals have long served as angel investors for the most violent militants in the region, providing the seed money that helped launch Islamic State and other jihadi groups. The cash flow from private donors is significant now and was even more significant in the early fund-raising done by Islamic State and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front.

Islamic State income

$600m from extortion and taxation in 2014
$500m overall from oil sales
$45m from kidnaps and ransoms in 2014

Source: Rand Corporation, US Treasury, UN
Islamic State Funding

Sales of artifacts may be one of the largest sources of funding for Islamic State. More than a third of Iraq’s important sites are under Islamic State’s control. It looted the 9th century BCE grand palace of the Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II at Kalhu (Nimrud). Tablets, manuscripts and cuneiforms, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were sold.

According to Victor Ivanov (head of the Russian anti-drug agency), Islamic State, like Boko Haram, makes money by trafficking Afghan heroin through its territory. The annual value of this business may be up to $1 billion.

Down: Facebook has removed pages that were flagged for reportedly selling artifacts (above) stolen by ISIS.
The conflict in Iraq and Syria is assuming an ethnic turn, as the Kurds take more "Arab" lands from the two countries. Involving Turkish troops is a serious possibility that is likely to carry unforeseen consequences, as does the prospect of creating "no-fly zones" in Syrian territory. Pro-Turkish militias are operating in Syria now, further complicating that country's role and perhaps bringing Turkish policy in conflict with US and Russian positions.
Consequences for the Region

Growing sectarianism threatens the legitimacy of the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other religiously divided countries. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the government finds itself in a dilemma: if it fails to stop Islamic State from bombing Saudi Shiite mosques, it will embolden the extremists and show that it cannot protect its own people. If it cracks down on Islamic State, it will risk looking like the champion of the country’s unloved Shiite minority, which could hurt its legitimacy among Sunni chauvinists.

The spread of Islamic State will worsen the region’s refugee crisis. If the core or the provinces expand, many Muslims and religious minorities will flee rather than endure Islamic State’s rule.

The long term prospects for Islamic State are uncertain at best. Its uncompromising views, universal hostility to critics and outsiders, and promises of perpetual survival and expansion to its followers provide only a narrow path to success.
Consequences for the Region

Expanding Presence in Libya

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter outlined a military option for Libya to President Obama’s top national security advisers at a principals meeting in February 2016. But the plan was not actively considered since the Obama administration was attempting to form a unity government from rival factions inside Libya.

Military Option: Airstrikes against as many as 30 to 40 targets in four areas of the country would deal a crippling blow to the Islamic State’s most dangerous affiliate outside of Iraq and Syria, and open the way for Western-backed Libyan militias to battle Islamic State fighters on the ground. Allied bombers would carry out additional airstrikes to support the militias.

Since that time, the US has elected a new president who has not yet committed to a position on, much less announced specific options regarding, Islamic State.
Consequences for the Region

Expanding Presence in Libya

Current military situation (as of 23 February 2016)
- Under the control of the Tobruk-led Government and Zintan Brigades
- Under the control of the New General National Congress and Libya Shield Force
- Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Ansar al-Sharia
- Under the control of local forces
- Under the control of Tuareg forces

(For a more detailed map, see Map of the current military situation in Libya)
**Consequences for the Region**

**Abandoning Sykes-Picot**

The president of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish north has called on global leaders to acknowledge that the Sykes-Picot Agreement that led to the boundaries of the modern Middle East has failed, and urged them to broker a new deal paving the way for a Kurdish state.

Regardless of the US and coalition presence in Iraq, there will be peace in the region only when historical forces are allowed to play out. What we’re seeing is the ongoing fracturing of nations into their historical component parts. Libya is now effectively split into three de facto states. Syria’s savage civil war has divided the nation into a patchwork of government and rebel-held zones. In Iraq, Kurdistan is already independent in all but name. Now all that’s needed is an independent Sunni state that would link Sunni-dominated territories on both sides of the border.

The sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites was not inevitable. It was, to some extent, the result of manipulation by self-interested elites. Nonetheless, it is now a reality. Applying the principles of self-determination to the Middle East has been contemplated but never fully realized ... perhaps it’s time.
Consequences for the Region

Abandoning Sykes-Picot
Consequences for the Region

Abandoning Sykes-Picot
Why a partitioned Iraq is a bad idea

July 30, 2014 9:30AM ET

by Jamie Tarabay - @jamietarabay

In May 2006, months into a rapidly deteriorating sectarian war in Iraq, then–Democratic Sen. Joe Biden wrote in The New York Times that the country’s partition was already underway.

“The Sunnis, who until recently believed they would retake power in Iraq, are beginning to recognize they won’t and don’t want to live in a Shiite-controlled, highly centralized state with laws enforced by sectarian militias,” he wrote in an op-ed jointly penned by Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The Shiites know they can dominate the government, but they can't defeat a Sunni insurrection. The Kurds will not give up their 15-year-old autonomy.”

Today, as large swaths of Iraq’s north are controlled by radical fighters largely loyal to the Islamic State (IS) extremist movement, Sunnis in Anbar’s west are in open rebellion against the heavily Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, and the Kurds are unlikely to hand back the newly acquired oil-rich city of Kirkuk, Biden and the Obama administration are cautioning against any breakup of the country, arguing that to do so would give space to IS and its ambitions to establish an Islamic caliphate across parts of Syria and Iraq.
Consequences for the Region

The Right Way to Partition Iraq (If Necessary)

Fred Dews  |  July 9, 2014 9:43am

In a new opinion piece, O'Hanlon and Joseph revisit their proposal in light of the current situation, writing that "Though it would be difficult to accomplish, federalism could still be a helpful element as Iraqis struggle through their current tragic mess."

The appeal of federalism could grow if Iraqi leaders in Baghdad cannot agree soon on a government of national unity, ideally one without Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has proven so divisive. Whether a "soft partition"—meaning the creation of a Sunni autonomous zone to complement the existing Kurdish one—or "hard partition"—meaning the formal redrawing of regional lines—it would seem a natural idea. Not only because of the recent violence, which has caused hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to flee their homes, but also the arbitrariness with which state borders were drawn by the European powers after World War One.

While Iraq's constitution allows for the possibility of a Sunni autonomous region that "may even persuade moderate Sunni leaders at the national, provincial and tribal levels to support a new government of national unity," O'Hanlon and Joseph say that "partition cannot be seen as an alternative to cooperation by Iraqi political leaders across sectarian lines. In fact, to be stabilizing and consistent with U.S. national security goals, restructuring Iraq via one of these means must be done collaboratively, not by fiat by one group or because of developments on the battlefield."
Global Opposition to Islamic State

Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR):
joint task force established by the international (US-led) coalition against ISIL
set up by the US Central Command to coordinate military efforts against Islamic State composed of US military forces and personnel from over 30 countries
Global Opposition to Islamic State

Islamic State’s popularity has diminished because it has “lost its brilliant victories.” Although Islamic State has hardly been defeated, local setbacks have demoralized some of its followers.

Progress has been made in reducing the amount of territory held by Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria, but competition and discord between and among local actors in both countries continue to create complications, as does intervention by and competition among regional and extra-regional actors, including Russia, Iran, Turkey and the Arab Gulf States.

These complications have become more immediate and relevant as Islamic State forces have ceded territory, and, in some places, struggles have commenced over who will define the future of liberated areas.
Global Opposition to Islamic State

From the West’s perspective the bigger concern is that as Islamic State grows, it will develop new staging grounds and operatives to use for international terrorist attacks.

Islamic State is not a threat to US security, US regional interests or even US allies. Islamic State's victims have not been primarily Americans or Israelis. Exaggeration of its possible threat to the US is based solely on its barbarism and its successful use of social media. But the US cannot give up its leadership role here and hope to maintain it elsewhere. Consider the following:

1. Reduce Islamic State’s access to fighters and weapons.
2. Pursue more effective military policy. Realistically, only five countries can and should take the fight to Islamic State - Syria, Iran, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.
Global Opposition to Islamic State

3. Develop a saner Syria policy: support the integrity of Syria, even under a despotic regime, and then work to reform and not necessarily uproot the regime.

4. Develop regional policies that deter volunteers from joining Islamic State and similar militant organizations.

5. Deliver on promises to help resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

6. Hang on to our compassion and openness no matter what.

Groups like the Islamic State seek to win over Muslims not only with violence, but also with propaganda that calls for a Holy War that pits an Islamic caliphate against a Christian West.

Western sympathy and support for the Muslim world, including Muslim refugees, clearly undercuts this idea of a clash of civilizations.

Islamic State thrives on division and rage and wants to make this a war between Islam and the West.

We shouldn’t play by their rules.
The End